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LAST YEAR, when I was assigned by the New York Times
to cover the Supreme Court, I discovered a surprising thing -
somebody had neglected to list the Court in the Washington telephone
book. There were pages of governmental bureaus, departments and
commissions - the Central Intelligence Agency was even listed - but
the Supreme Court had been inadvertently left out.
I soon learned that this was a very significant oversight.
The three branches of the Government are undoubtedly equal
under the Constitution, but this incident suggests how different the
judicial branch is in its relations with the public. To appreciate the
extent of this difference, it is only necessary to imagine what would have
happened if the White House had been omitted from the telephone book.
Of course, the courts should maintain basically different rela-
tions with the public than the other branches of the Government.
The aloof dignity of the Supreme Court reflects this relationship,
and a reporter who is exposed to it for any period of time tends to
forget that the press is not always held at arms length from justice
in other courts.
This was brought home to me recently when I arrived in Chicago
and saw this headline in the Chicago Tribune:'
NEW SLAYING CLUE FOUND
MATCH GIRL'S BOOT PRINT IN COACH'S CAR
WIFE BARS POLICE FROM HOME
The first few paragraphs read:
State's Atty. William Hopf of Du Page county disclosed
yesterday a muddy foot print that matches up with the boots
worn by slain Debbie Fijan, 10, had been found in the car of
Loren Schofield, 27, her accused slayer.
Hopf said the car had been impounded by Sheriff Stanley
Lynch and has been examined for possible evidence. No finger
prints of Debbie's have been found in the car.
'He says his wife wears boots like Debbie wore,' said Hopf.
'That remains to be determined. We do know that the boot print
matches up with Debbie's boots.'
t B.A., 1953, Yale University; LL.B., 1959, Vanderbilt University; Diploma in
Law, Oxford, 1960; Supreme Court Correspondent for the New York Tine .
1. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
2. Ibid.
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This statement by a member of the bar caused me to wonder if
I had accurately remembered the ethical Canons' prohibitions against
press statements by lawyers. Since I was in Chicago to cover an
American Bar Association meeting, I picked up a copy of the Canons
of Professional Ethics.
Canon 20 said:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the courts and other-
wise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they
are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular
case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make
it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not
go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the
court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid an ex parte
statement.
This deep involvement of a lawyer in a prejudicial press story
was reminiscent of a case involving prejudicial publicity that had
just been argued in the Supreme Court. It was the sensational case'
involving Dr. Sam Sheppard, an osteopathic surgeon from a stylish
Cleveland suburb. Dr. Sheppard had been convicted in 1954 of second
degree murder in the slaying of his pregnant wife, Marilyn. Almost
ten years later he was released in habeas corpus proceedings by a
Federal District Judge.4 The Judge ruled that Dr. Sheppard had
been denied due process because of "the insidious, prejudicial news-
paper reporting, the refusal of the trial judge to question jurors re-
garding an alleged prejudicial radio broadcast and the carnival atmos-
phere which continued throughout the trial. . . ."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed.6 It re-
viewed the same record and found the newspaper publicity within
reasonable bounds and the actions of the trial judge within its proper
discretion.
Sheppard's theory before the Supreme Court was that the Cleve-
land Press, a crusading newspaper with an aggressive editor, had
used inflammatory articles and editorials to force law enforcement
officials to proceed against him, even though there was insufficient
proof to justify a trial. Having precipitated a trial, Dr. Sheppard said,
the Press then pushed for a conviction to avoid the libel suits that
would have followed an acquittal.
3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, cert. granted, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
4. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
5. Id. at 63.
6. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Unfortunately for Dr. Sheppard, the circumstances of his wife's
murder lent themselves to vivid coverage in the press. His story -
that he grappled with a "bushy-haired intruder" of uncertain sex, was
knocked unconscious and regained consciousness to find his wife
)ludgeoned to death - was an intriguing one by any standard. Beyond
that, the fact that he was immediately hospitalized by his physician
brothers, and was thereafter shielded from the police by his lawyers,
provided grist for the Cleveland Press claim that the matter was being
covered up.
But while Dr. Sheppard's attorney had many critical things to
say about the Cleveland Press before the Supreme Court, his basic
legal attack was directed against the judge and the prosecutor.
He contended that the trial judge had means at his disposal to
protect Dr. Sheppard from the effects of the publicity before and
during the trial. As he saw it, the judge did not employ them because
he enjoyed the publicity and profited politically from it. Specifically,
he contended that the judge should have granted a change of venue
or a continuance, that he should not have allowed the large press con-
tingent to mar the decorum of the courtroom, that he should not have
allowed the jurors to be made press celebrities during the trial, and
that he should have excused himself because of prejudice against the
defendant.
In an amicus curiae brief, the American Civil Liberities Union
asked the Supreme Court to declare that the following types of pub-
licity are inherently prejudicial, and that the presence of any of them,
without a further showing of actual prejudice, amounts to a denial
of due process:
I. Damaging publicity procured or cooperated in by state
law enforcement authorities.
II. Damaging publicity relating to prospective testimony of
prosecution witnesses not actually offered at the trial by the
prosecution.
III. Damaging publicity describing evidence which, if of-
fered by the prosecution at trial, would have been inadmissible and
constitutionally prejudicial.
IV. Publicity which makes well-known personalities of the
trial jurors.
V. Damaging publicity of an accusatory nature, whether or
not participated in by law enforcement authorities, which charges
guilt or attacks the character or reputation of the accused.7
7. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and Ohio Civil Liberties Union as
amici curiae, p. 16, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
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The ACLU argued that if the Court should announce that this
type of publicity will henceforth automatically vitiate a conviction, then
the press will voluntarily stop printing it, and policemen, prosecutors
and judges will see to it that prejudicial information does not reach the
press.
In effect, the Sheppard argument to the Supreme Court was
posed in the same terms as this symposium - it was "a free press and
a fair trial", not "free press vs. fair trial."
This is a crucial difference, because the problem can be resolved -
or at least greatly ameliorated - through an approach that preserves
both free press and fair trials. From the standpoint of the legal pro-
fession, it means achieving this ideal the hard way. But it is by far
the best way for the country as a whole, and it is the only approach
that the legal profession can honestly afford to take.
The method is simple. If the legal profession and the judiciary
would put their own houses in order, the remaining problems - if
any - could surely be worked out with the fourth estate. If the bar
would begin to enforce its own ethical rules concerning statements
to the press, and if the judiciary would censure publicity-happy judges
and silence prosecutors and police officials (as has been done in the
federal system), much of the prejudicial matter would disappear from
the press.
The result would not be merely that news sources would be cut off;
if the people who have responsibility for justice would demonstrate
enough concern about prejudicial publicity to discipline themselves, the
press would realize the seriousness of the situation, and take steps
of its own.
It is unfortunate that this is not the only possible way to
approach this problem. If it were irrevocably established that the
Constitution would not permit any other approach, the bench and bar
might resolve the problem by internal measures.
Of course, most lawyers would read our constitutional history as
prohibiting any attempt to prevent prejudicial publicity by direct
judicial regulation of the press. The Supreme Court clearly stated a
quarter of a century ago that the first amendment prevents our judges
from employing the English system of using the contempt power to
punish newspapers for publishing statements that the judges do not
like about pending litigation." In the briefs and arguments in the
Sheppard case, counsel and Court alike seemed to assume that the
8. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). Cf., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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same would be true if the publicity was not aimed at the, judge, but
was instead prejudicial to the defendant's case.9
The Supreme Court has never ruled squarely on this point, how-
ever, and those of us who wrote smug articles assuming that Ralph
Ginzburg would never go to jail for violating Federal obscenity laws
have learned to our sorrow that the first amendment can be much more
flexible than we had been led to believe.
10
This is especially unsettling in view of an apparent let-the-
Supreme-Court-handle-it tendency in our society. With the Court
riding an impressive winning streak, this is probably only natural.
Legislative apportionment, race relations and criminal justice were
stagnant, festering problems until the Supreme Court stepped in (and
here, too, there were constitutional precedents to the contrary) and
jolted the nation into progressive movement. After some grumbling,
Congress became so impressed that it passed to the Justices the whole
problem of poll taxes in state elections, thereby saving itself the bother
of abolishing them by statute or constitutional amendment."
But a judicial answer is not always the ideal solution to every
problem, and it would be a sad matter if the legal profession became
convinced that all that is really needed to resolve this one is five votes
on the Supreme Court.
This could only result in direct restrictions on press freedom,
and it would invariably reach beyond pure criminal trial questions to
other aspects of news reporting. The fact that judicial interference
with the press is tolerated in England is no indication that it would
not infect our free press system in America. English judges and
prosecutors are not elected. They are not beholding to political ma-
chines. By tradition and practice, they are isolated from partisan
affairs.
But justice in America - in the state courts, at least - has ties
to the political forces with which the press must often deal on bare-
knuckle terms. Experienced American journalists know instinctively
how any English-style press control would work in practice here. As
E. Clifton Daniel, Managing Editor of the New York Times,
has put it, it would be unthinkable "to hand over control of the press
to political-minded prosecutors and judges who may be running for
election and seeking the support of the very newspapers they are
empowered to censure and discipline." 2
9. See Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
10. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
11. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12. Address by E. Clifton Daniel, National District Attorneys Association Annual
Convention, March 17, 1965.
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At this time, the leaders of the bar are thinking in much more
constrictive terms. The American Bar Association has sponsored an
intensive study of the matter by a group of lawyers headed by Justice
Paul C. Reardon of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Its
report will be made public this fall. At the same time, a special com-
mittee of the ABA has been overhauling the Canons of Professional
Ethics, and there is every reason to expect that the new rules will re-
flect the conclusions of Judge Reardon's group. In addition, the
Philadelphia Bar Association and other groups have pressed for a
tightening up of the Canons governing press statements by lawyers.
These are encouraging signs, but unhappily, there are no apparent
indications that the bar is any more willing than before to enforce the
Canons on prejudicial publicity.
We all realize that our profession has tolerated far too long an
unwholesome "live and let live" attitude toward unethical conduct.
A study of this aspect of the problem reveals a particularly unsavory
picture. There appear to be no statistics on the extent of enforcement,
if any, of the ethical rules pertaining to prejudicial statements by
lawyers. A check of the activities of the American Bar Association's
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances reveals reams of
opinions concerning the solicitation of business by lawyers, but the
Committee has considered Canon 20 on only one occasion - an inci-
dent in 1938 when antitrust lawyers complained about press statements
issued by the Attorney General of the United States in connection with
the Government's antitrust activities.'" This is a sad fact indeed.
Furthermore, an examination of the books and articles on legal
ethics discloses no evidence that any lawyer has ever been disciplined
by the legal profession for prejudicial press statements. Dean Erwin
N. Griswold, of the Harvard Law School, has summarized the situa-
tion in these terms:
In this country, we have relaxed our professional standards
far too much. District Attorneys are generally elected, and de-
fense attorneys are likely to have political ambitions. In most
states, judges are elected, and find it difficult to enforce high
standards of professional conduct on the lawyers who appear
before them. We have no centralized control of the bar, such as
exists in England through the Inns of Court for the barristers,
and the Law Society for the solicitors - bodies which would not
tolerate for a moment conduct by lawyers which has become, alas,
commonplace in many parts of the United States. ...
13. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, OPINIONS OP COMMITTEE ON PROPESSIONAL
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, 400-03 (1957).
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Because of this diverse and loose control, standards have gen-
erally fallen too low with respect to the conduct of lawyers in
making public statements about pending cases and in releasing
information to the press.' 4
As Dean Griswold points out, the bench could perform a crucial
role in resolving this problem. But to my knowledge, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey is the only state high court that has invoked its
supervisory powers to prohibit lawyers and law enforcement officers
from giving prejudicial information to the press. 5 The Attorney
General of the United States has performed this function for the
federal system through rules that specify in detail the information
that United States law enforcement officers and attorneys may release
to the press concerning pending cases.' 6 This action was applauded by
the press, and it has provided federal officials (who have traditionally
been more discreet in these matters than their counterparts in the
states) with useful guidelines for dealing with the news media.
This is not to say that the press should be excused for its short-
comings on this score. Some of the headlines and articles that are
published about criminal cases are enough to make any thoughtful
newsman blush. It does suggest, however, that the press cannot be
expected to appreciate the importance of exercising responsibility in
trial coverage until the bench and bar care enough to use some self-
discipline of their own.
This feeling is not prompted by any defensive reflex of a reporter,
rather, by a lawyer's sense of professional responsibility. While I
deeply appreciate the invitation to discuss this subject with you, I do
disown my billing on the program. This paper is not a newspaperman's
view; it is a lawyer's concern. For that is where the initial responsi-
bility lies for maintaining a free press and assuring fair trials.
14. Griswold, Responsibility of the Legal Profession, Harvard Today, Jan. 1965,
p. 10.
15. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, 850 (1964).
16. See Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Information by Personnel
of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings, 30 Fed. Reg. 5510,
28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965).
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